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REAL ARROW-SECURITIES FOR ALL: JUST AND EFFICIENT 
INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING 
 
ROBERT HOCKETT* 
 
Abstract 
 
 As a new hurricane season opened in June of 2006, it emerged 
that a number of onlines gaming sites were offering bettors the 
opportunity to wager on whether New Orleans might suffer another 
Katrina calamity. Commentators condemned the announced practice 
with howls of disgust, labeling it both tasteless and heartless. Perhaps 
they were right. All I could think about as one who grew up in New 
Orleans, however, was how risk pools might hereby be broadened to 
include all the world’s bettors. We shouldn’t condemn these people; we 
should use them—while requiring that they maintain margin accounts 
at their betting sites. For to bet on an event’s happening is a way to 
insure against it, and there are currently more things we’re able to bet 
on than to purchase ordinary insurance policies against. 
This essay elaborates and draws consequences from that 
observation. In a manner I hope is more concretely appreciable and 
intuitively graspable than in more technical work I did some years 
back, I work to show that we have it within our power to spread risks 
both more justly and more efficiently than we do now—in effect by 
designing new hedging instruments suitable for “ordinary Janes and 
Joes.” In this sense the essay amounts to a contribution to the project 
of “democratizing” finance. Working along such lines now seems 
particularly worthwhile, as more and more people below the tops of 
our income and wealth distributions face more and more uninsurable 
risks—both to labor incomes and to that one form of wealth which they 
hold when they hold anything more than mere “human capital”—their 
homes.      
                                                 
* Professor of Enterprise-Organizational and Finance-Regulatory Law, Cornell 
Law School; Founding Board Member, The Occupy Money Cooperative; 
Fellow, The Century Foundation; recent Consulting Counsel, International 
Monetary Fund; and recent Resident Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York.  Many thanks to Tobias Adrian, Dan Alpert, Kaushik Basu, Mike 
Campbell, Bob Frank, Henry Hansmann, Daniel Markovits, Jerry Mashaw, 
Aziz Rana, John Roemer, Nouriel Roubini, Bob Shiller, Bill Simon, Sascha 
Somek, Peter Spiegler, Art Wilmarth, and especially Saule Omarova for many 
helpful discussions of the subjects of this essay.   
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Introduction 
 
As a new hurricane season opened in June of 2006, it emerged 
that a number of online gaming sites were offering bettors the 
opportunity to wager on whether New Orleans might suffer another 
Katrina calamity.1 Commentators condemned the announced practice 
with howls of disgust, labeling it both tasteless and heartless.2 Perhaps 
they were right. All I could think about as one who grew up in New 
Orleans, however, was how risk pools might hereby be broadened to 
include all the world’s bettors. We shouldn’t condemn these people; we 
should use them—while requiring that they maintain margin accounts 
at their betting sites. For to bet on an event’s happening is a way to 
insure against it,3 and there are currently more things we’re able to bet 
on than to purchase ordinary insurance policies against.   
This essay elaborates on, and draws consequences from, that 
observation. In a manner I hope is more concretely appreciable and 
intuitively graspable than in more technical work I did some years 
back,4 I work to show that we have it within our power to spread risks 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Wanna Bet That a Hurricane Will Hit U.S.? Now You Can, USA 
TODAY (July 4, 2006, 11:08 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/ 
hurricane/2006-07-02-hurricane-betting_x.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
2RXY-2ZTP. 
2 Id. 
3 See Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: 
Information, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New Markets for Systemic-
Income-Risk-Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a “New Econo-
my,” 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 210-11 (2004) [hereinafter Just 
Insurance]. 
4 See generally id.; Robert C. Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A 
Meta-Theory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005) [hereinafter Deep 
Grammar of Distribution]; Robert Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe: 
Preferences, Principles, and Imperatives in Law and Policy, 18 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 391 (2009) [hereinafter Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe]; Robert 
Hockett, Pareto Versus Welfare (Cornell L. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-031, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1309699 [hereinafter Pareto Versus Welfare]; Robert Hockett, Taking 
Distribution Seriously (Cornell L. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-004, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108217 
[hereinafter Taking Distribution Seriously], archived at http://perma.cc/ZZN3-
5G3Q; Robert Hockett, Market Completeness, Market Neutrality, and 
Ethically Cognizable Efficiency: An Ordinal Equivalence Theorem (2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
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both more justly and more efficiently than we do now—in effect by 
designing new hedging instruments suitable for “ordinary Janes and 
Joes.” In this sense the essay amounts to a contribution to the project of 
“democratizing” finance. Working along such lines now seems 
particularly worthwhile, as more and more people below the tops of our 
income and wealth distributions face more and more uninsurable 
risks—both to labor incomes and to that one form of wealth which they 
hold when they hold anything more than mere “human capital”—their 
homes. 
To see why this project might be important to more than just 
New Orleanians, consider the following. Many contemporary societies 
appear to be vexed of late by two complementary trends. One is 
dramatic and still-worsening income and wealth inequality.5 The other 
is income and wealth insecurity on the part of those under the tops of 
those inequalities.6 There also appear to be at least two distinct drivers 
of the two mentioned trends. First is that those under the tops of the 
relevant inequalities derive most of their incomes from labor rather 
than capital, while returns to the latter outpace returns to the former 
through time.7 Second is that markets as we presently find them afford 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Robert Hockett & Daniel Dillon, Income Inequality and Market 
Fragility: Some Empirics in the Political Economy of Finance (2013) 
[hereinafter Income Inequality and Market Fragility] (under review by E. 
ECON. REV.) (manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204710, archived at http://perma.cc/U3S7-HGZP. 
6 See, e.g., Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 110-11; Robert Hockett, 
Making Sense of the Health Care Reform Debate, CHALLENGE, Jan.-Feb. 2010, 
at 28, 49-51 [hereinafter Making Sense]. 
7 See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Materializing Citizenship: Finance in a Producers’ 
Republic, 63 EMORY L. J. ONLINE 2071, 2084 (2014), http://law.emory.edu/ 
elj/documents/volumes/63/6/online/hockett.pdf [hereinafter Materializing 
Citizenship], archived at http://perma.cc/5F59-MHW7; cf. Robert Hockett, 
What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other 
SOPs, and “Ownership Societies,” 92 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 877 (2007) 
[hereinafter What Kinds of Stock]. See generally Robert Hockett, A Jeffer-
sonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in 
the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership 
Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005) [hereinafter Jeffersonian Republic by 
Hamiltonian Means]; Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Whose Ownership?]. See also, of 
course, THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014), which has drawn sorely needed public attention at 
last to this development. For two interesting earlier works along these lines, see 
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little opportunity to diversify risks that attend income or wealth 
deriving entirely from (a) labor on the one hand, and (b) that principal 
form of nonhuman capital which most of the nonwealthy hold when 
they hold anything other than human capital, on the other hand—their 
homes.8  
 If you’ll pardon the pun, the first mentioned driver of inequal-
ity and insecurity is a matter of capital importance in any polity 
founded, as was ours in the U.S., on what I call a “productive 
republican” ethos.9 Productive republican citizens tend to favor stocks 
over flows, property over contract, and private over public, such that 
welfare state transfer systems tend over time to fall prey to political 
suspicion and squabbling.10 For this reason much of my research and 
writing concerns how we might act collectively to make individual 
capital-owners of more citizens.11 This work, I anticipate, will 
continue.12 
I also believe, however, that the second mentioned driver of 
inequality and insecurity matters a great deal, and I’ve accordingly 
written on this also.13 But there is much more to be said—particularly 
in light of the just mentioned prospect of spreading more capital more 
widely to more citizens.14 For success with that project itself will 
                                                                                                       
generally ASSAF RAZIN & EFRAIM SADKA, LABOR, CAPITAL, AND FINANCE: 
INTERNATIONAL FLOWS (2001); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and 
the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519 (1997). See also Hockett, 
Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 110.  
8 See, e.g., Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 213-221. 
9 See Hockett, Materializing Citizenship, supra note 7, at 2072 & n.5.  
10 The idea is that entitlements secured by property rights are more secure than 
those secured by contract or government “entitlement program.” That in turn 
means that already accumulated property—stocks—are more secure than 
future income—flows—even when one is legally entitled to the latter. See 
generally id. for more on this complex of thought, its apparent historical 
origins, and its manifestations in American public policy since the founding.  
11 See generally Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra 
note 7; Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3; Hockett, Materializing 
Citizenship, supra note 7; Hockett, What Kinds of Stock, supra note 7; Hockett, 
Whose Ownership?, supra note 7. 
12 See, e.g., Robert Hockett, A Republic of Owners: Jeffersonian Democracy, 
Hamiltonian Finance, and a Blueprint for Permanent Post-Crisis Recovery 
(2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
13 See generally Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3.  
14 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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occasion new risks—risks to the incomes the new capital generates. 
Hence there are at least two complementary reasons to query whether 
we might more fully complete our risk-diversification markets: (a) to 
lessen income and wealth insecurities currently faced by our non-
wealthy citizens, and (b) to minimize such insecurities as might later 
face citizens once we make capital-owners of more of them. 
Why worry about these things, you might ask. My reasons 
sound in both justice and efficiency. As to the first, some distributions 
of wealth, income, and risk are just wrongful.15 Most societies aim to 
minimize wrongful, and to vindicate rightful, distributions—that’s part 
of what property, contract, tort and criminal law, not to mention tax and 
other policies, sometimes are about.16 As to efficiency, dramatic wealth 
and income disparities tend, as I have shown elsewhere, to issue in 
wealth-destructive forms of market volatility.17  Our most recent crisis, 
in fact, is demonstrably a case in point.18 But dramatic disparities in 
risk-bearing can be inefficient as well—not only as causes in rein-
forcing the volatility-inducing effects of wealth and income disparities 
themselves, but also as manifestations, in evidencing the absence of 
markets that channel risks to their most efficient bearers.19  
We have known since Ken Arrow’s, Gerard Debreu’s, and 
Lionel McKenzie’s pioneering work of over half a century ago that 
introducing certain state-contingent claims to a market can, by 
“completing” that market—that is, by enabling its participants to price 
and provide against unpleasant future contingencies in the same 
currency they use to buy goods and services—facilitate its reaching a 
state of Walrasian general equilibrium, with all the efficiency features 
that such states entail.20 We also have known, since likewise pioneering 
                                                 
15 See generally, e.g., Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 4; see 
also Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 111; infra Part II.  
16 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 111-12. 
17 See generally Hockett & Dillon, Income Inequality and Market Fragility, 
supra note 5. 
18 See, e.g., id. at 12 & fig.1. 
19 See infra Part III; see also Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 256. 
20 See generally GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE (1959); Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Le Rôle de Valeurs Boursières pour la Répartition la Meilleure des 
Risques, 40 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE 
NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953); see also Maurice 
Allais, Généralisation des Théories de L’Equilibre Economique Général et du 
Rendement Social au Cas du Risque, 40 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES 
INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 
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work by Bill Baumol, Serge-Christophe Kolm, Elisha Pazner, David 
Schmeidler, and Hal Varian done some twenty years later, that such an 
equilibrium, if reached via trades that proceed from an equal division of 
resources among trading agents, will be fully as fair, on a plausible 
understanding of fairness, as it is efficient.21   
We have not known, however, what I believe to be two equally 
important things. 
The first is that, on any ethically interesting conception of 
efficiency, to render a market more “complete” in the sense just alluded 
to is likewise to render it both more efficient and more fair in the sense 
just alluded to.22 And the second is that we can actually render our 
markets much more complete, hence more fair and efficient, than they 
currently are. We can do that essentially by designing a variety of what 
would nowadays be called “state claims,” or “Arrow securities, “a kind 
of derivative aimed at enabling people below the tops of their national 
income and wealth distributions to insure both their housing wealth and 
their labor incomes.23 And this means, in light of the foregoing, that by 
                                                                                                       
81 (1953); Maurice Allais, L’Extension des Théories de l’Equilibre Econo-
mique Général et du Rendement Social au Cas du Risque, 21 ECONOMETRICA 
269 (1953). The results are anticipated by J. R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL 
(2d ed. 1946), the theory of which generalizes from observations of the 
behavior of early twentieth century British futures markets. A thorough 
contemporary synthesis of prior and recent developments is 1 MICHAEL 
MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS (1996). An 
interesting recent account of the work of Arrow, Debreu, and McKenzie, 
suitable for a popular audience, is TILL DÜPPE & E. ROY WEINTRAUB, FINDING 
EQUILIBRIUM: ARROW, DEBREU, MCKENZIE AND THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC 
CREDIT (2014).  
21 See, e.g., SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM, JUSTICE ET ÉQUITÉ (1972); SOCIAL 
GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ELISHA PAZNER 
(Leonid Hurwicz et al. eds., 1985); Hal R. Varian, Equity, Envy, and Effi-
ciency, 9 J. ECON. THEORY 63 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Two Problems in the 
Theory of Fairness, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 249 (1976). A helpful synthesis is 
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS (1986). 
22 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 4, at 1238-39; 
Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe, supra note 4, at 403; Hockett, Pareto 
Versus Welfare, supra note 4, at 2-3; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, 
supra note 4, at 74-76; Hockett, Market Completeness, supra note 4. 
23 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 237-38; Hockett, Taking 
Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 74-75; infra Part IV. 
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designing and facilitating markets for such state claims as these we can 
render our economies more just and efficient.24 
My hope with this essay, then, is to elaborate and substantiate 
these last two claims in an intuitively accessible manner, since I have 
done so in more formal manners elsewhere.25 I’d like, in other words, to 
show in a straightforward way just how easily we might act collectively 
to render income and wealth risk more individually insurable, thereby 
bringing greater justice and efficiency to our economies.                  
 Here, then, is how I’ll proceed. Part I first tells an all-too-
familiar tale of two middle class citizens who work hard and “play” by 
the proverbial “rules,” but face risks to their incomes and accumulated 
possessions that presently are not insurable. It then suggests that, for 
reasons that sound in both justice and efficiency, we should as a polity 
hope to find means of enabling ourselves and our fellow citizens to 
insure against such risks where possible. We should, in other words, 
collectively enable ourselves individually to provide against risks that 
uniquely attend each of our livelihoods and, when we have them, our 
assets.  
Part II then explains with more care what I mean by “both just 
and efficient” when I speak of “both just and efficient insurance.” It 
does so by systematically cataloguing deep analytical parallels between 
justice and insurance theory. Part III then returns to the tale told in Part 
I, systematically showing both why, by reference to insurance theory, 
efficient markets for the needed insurance are missing, and why, by 
reference to justice theory, we should in justice wish to supply such 
markets where possible. Parts IV and V then show how we can supply 
such markets, thereby effecting a simultaneously more just, and more 
efficient, distribution of basic risks faced by our citizens. Part VI 
presents a conclusion that wraps things up and looks forward.  
   
                                                 
24 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 237-38; infra Part V. 
25 See generally Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3; Hockett, Deep 
Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22; Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t 
Prescribe, supra note 22; Hockett, Pareto Versus Welfare, supra note 22; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15; Hockett, Market 
Completeness, supra note 22. 
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I. Motivating the Proposal: Bob & Barbara Go Steadily, 
Faultlessly, Needlessly Bust 
 
I’ll start with a story that might ring familiar.26 Meet Bob and 
Barbara. Bob is a small town lawyer. He has been in practice since the 
mid-1980s, when he graduated from his state university law school. He 
is in his mid-fifties, and is pretty good at what he does. His practice 
involves, primarily, drafting wills and advising private parties in estate-
planning, assisting small business people in the formation of business 
partnerships or limited liability companies and the drafting of contracts, 
facilitating small business transactions and negotiations, and like work. 
When Bob decided to become a lawyer, the town where he 
lived and grew up was humble but reasonably prosperous. Its popula-
tion had been by and large stable in size, perhaps slowly growing, for 
decades. It was a pleasant, easy place to live. Bob was very much taken 
with the character of Atticus Finch in the Harper Lee novel, and went 
to law school with the aim of becoming his own town’s Atticus. Upon 
graduating he returned to his home town, hung out a shingle, soon 
married his high school sweetheart, Barbara, who had attended the 
business school at Bob’s university and now owned a small sole 
proprietorship, and made a down-payment on a stately, one hundred 
year-old “fixer-upper” of a late Victorian home. 
Soon Bob and Barbara began to bring children into the world. 
Bob did not make a great deal of money in his practice, but he earned 
enough, when added to Barbara’s income, to keep the family quite 
comfortable, to set aside funds in anticipation of the children’s 
education, to improve the house and keep the mortgage payments up to 
date.  
Sometime in the early- to mid-1990s, things began to just 
noticeably change in Bob’s and Barbara’s town. Fewer children 
                                                 
26 The remainder of this Part I is largely drawn from an article I published in 
2004 titled Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: Information, 
Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk-
Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a “New Economy” in the 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, now 
called the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. See 
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 214-18. All rights relating to this Part 
of the Article reside with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Interna-
tional Law, and I thank the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Law for allowing my use of this analogy and thereby facilitating the further 
development of this field of scholarship. 
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appeared to be being born there, and fewer still were staying or return-
ing to town after graduating from university. The population was gradu-
ally aging, and more people seemed to be departing than moving in. 
About the same time, a number of large, multi-department 
retail stores and fast food establishments began to crop up on the 
outskirts of the town, capitalizing upon national and even global 
economies of scale (often, indeed, selling cheap imported goods from 
developing countries). These stores tended to pay their employees—
first teenagers and retirees, then increasingly young and middle-aged 
adults—lower wages in order to offer goods and services at yet cheaper 
prices. These businesses attracted customers away from the charming 
town square, and many of the independent, locally owned shops and 
restaurants that once had brought in or paid living profits, salaries, or 
wages and rendered that square so quaint and enjoyable began to 
deteriorate or close. Barbara’s business was among those affected. 
The new businesses tended to retain counsel from the larger 
law firms located in the nearest metropolitan area, not Bob, when in 
need of legal assistance. And, of course, there now were fewer in-town 
clients requiring recourse to Bob’s particular portfolio of skills—skills 
like contract and will drafting and so on—which Bob had developed 
carefully and gradually with the local clientele’s needs in view. The 
larger law firms, not all that surprisingly, also were uninterested in 
what Bob might offer. He was no longer all that young, and, as noted 
before, he had developed his capacities very much with a particular set 
of needs—classic, small town needs—in view. 
What is more, there were scores of younger lawyers, still 
protean and not yet fully formed, pouring out of the law schools each 
year. These folk generally preferred, and were more easily adaptable to, 
the city lawyer’s life and work than was Bob. So even were Bob’s 
livelihood the only thing that mattered to him or the only piper to 
whose tune Bob had to dance, it is far from clear that he could simply 
have changed his clientele and practice areas. Similar observations, 
alas, hold of Barbara as well. The business acumen she first developed 
at school and then honed at a local business or two, seemed to grow 
less and less needed in the town’s steadily proliferating “big box” 
stores. 
On top of all this, even had Bob and his family been voca-
tionally and temperamentally prepared to relocate to some place far 
distant where Bob’s and Barbara’s abilities might have been more 
marketable, they would in a sense still have been, in significant 
measure, in other ways “locked-in” to their present place of residence. 
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It is not simply that their lives, children, and traditions have been rooted 
in their town now for decades. 
It is, for one, that their children, well educable in the public 
schools of their present town, would have to attend distant magnet or 
expensive private schools in the larger city were the family to move, 
and were they to hope that the children might continue developing their 
minds and their sociabilities as well as they currently are doing. And it 
is, at least as urgently, that Bob’s and Barbara’s parents, now up in 
years, are in need of assistance and unlikely to live very much longer 
should they themselves relocate. They might, of course, move to the 
larger city with their children and their grandchildren, but this would 
seem quite difficult to pull off. For a nursing home would be quite 
expensive, not to say demoralizing. 
So, of course, would a new home, given the decline in property 
values in the hometown consequent on that town’s current economic 
prospects, and the greater expense of a place in the city or its suburbs. 
And Bob and Barbara would have to work farther from the home than 
they do at present, and thus be unable to look in on their parents during 
the day should the entire family take up residence in one large house. 
It also seems unlikely that Bob and Barbara will be able to 
afford so large a home as would be required by the latter prospect in 
any event. For because their present town’s economic prospects are, 
again, at least for the time being, on the wane, their own present 
property value also has diminished markedly, while Bob and Barbara 
remain contractually committed to making mortgage payments tied to 
the home’s previous value. Their principal “nest egg,” then, is fully as 
imperiled as are their sources of labor income, and for largely the same 
reason. 
Bob, Barbara, and family are increasingly in a bind. They are 
going to have to make some very painful choices. And no matter what 
choice they make, they are going to be significantly worse-off than they 
used to be and, not unnaturally, expected by this point in their lives to 
be.27   
                                                 
27 I could have made the story a bit more poignant by picturing Bob as, for 
example, a steel or other industrial worker. In such cases his losses would be 
even more dramatic, and more directly wrought by economic “globalization.” I 
keep Bob as he is, however, in order to show that even less dramatic examples 
closer to home give reason to consider markets such as I propose. Much of 
what I say on behalf of Bob the small town lawyer could be said of Bob the 
steel worker. 
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Now, here are some questions. Could Bob and Barbara have 
acted to prevent things coming to this pass? Was the whole scenario, in 
the language of the law, reasonably foreseeable in the 1980s? Are Bob 
and Barbara in any recognizable sense at fault for having relied, to their 
detriment, upon things’ going largely as they’d gone for decades? Is 
there anything, realistically speaking, that they could have done to 
mitigate this, and is there now?   
In light of our answers to the foregoing—particularly if we 
answered “no”—is it just for Bob, Barbara, and theirs to suffer? Is it 
welfare-efficient, for that matter, if, for example, someone else might 
have willingly shared this risk with them, for a premium, had it not 
been for the absence of any market in such risk? Would it not in any 
event be more just and more efficient if such risk-trading opportunities 
had been available, or if they were now? Well then, why aren’t they?    
What we are envisaging in our story, of course, is a classic 
social-insurance-implicative set of scenarios. Social insurance is meant 
precisely to ease some of the “no fault” hardships and dislocations that 
we find occasioned by sundry unforeseeable catastrophes and gradual 
macroeconomic changes. Significantly, however, there is no form of 
social insurance currently on offer in “developed” economies that fully 
or near-fully addresses Bob’s and Barbara’s predicament. 
Now, one way of looking at social insurance is as a surrogate 
for missing markets. For familiar reasons that we shall get into a bit 
more below, we do not currently find private insurance markets for the 
trading or laying-off of risks like those now emerging for Bob and his 
family—risks that could more efficiently be borne by more well-to-do 
people than Bob and Barbara. Social insurance programs, administered 
by governments possessed of authority over broad territorial expanses, 
step in to fill some of the more dramatic of the resultant gaps, by 
exploiting governmental powers to universalize risk pools and collect 
compulsory premia in the form of taxes, and by their powers to 
monitor, to some extent, insureds. 
But there are well-known information costs and consequent 
inefficiencies that attend such monitoring efforts.28 There also are 
                                                 
28 Concern with the difficulties of monitoring beneficiaries of Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families payments, of course, prompted the “end to 
welfare as we [knew] it.” Governor Bill Clinton, The New Covenant: Respon-
sibility and Rebuilding the American Community (Oct. 23, 1991), available at 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/ 
c24.txtp, archived at http://perma.cc/8WGD-LHMN. See also the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 
2014-2015 REAL ARROW-SECURITIES FOR ALL 621 
 
 
constant political pressures to exit the compulsory premium-paying risk 
pools—i.e., to be let off the taxation or “mandate” hooks—exerted by 
many who, often by Providence—e.g., inherited wealth—rather than 
diligence, find themselves less subject to risk, even while less risk-
averse, than others. The two sources of instability, of course, dovetail: 
Opportunistic behavior by some who exploit the difficulties that attend 
monitoring afford ammunition to the better-off who denigrate the 
legitimacy of social insurance programs. 
It is accordingly worthwhile asking whether, by both returning 
to first principles and turning to new mathematical, legal, and 
information technologies only recently to have become available and 
still coming online, we might actually provide the heretofore missing 
markets for which standard social insurance programs are offered as 
coarse-grained and incomplete substitutes. 
If we might, then we might supplement existing social 
insurance programs with new forms of de facto social insurance—new 
forms, indeed, of actually, literally, privately provided insurance. And 
thus we might, by means not subject to the classic vulnerabilities of 
traditional social insurance programs, spare Bob, his family, and many 
like them much of their apparently unfairly and inefficiently borne 
anguish. We might, that is, render the distribution of certain kinds of 
risk both more efficient and more just in the bearing. I turn first, then, 
to those advertised “first principles.” Then I will look to those 
technologies and markets-soon-to-be. (I’ll get back to Barbara and Bob, 
too.) 
 
II. Why We Should Work Toward a Happy Ending: Of Justice 
and Insurance 
 
The tale of Barbara and Bob as just told is a tale of both justice 
and insurance. It is a tale of “life’s” being “unfair,” and of how we 
collectively sometimes attempt, and yet fail, to render it more fair. The 
reasons we fail, for their part, are reasons that sound in certain 
structural impediments that bedevil our efforts. Insofar as these 
                                                                                                       
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.), through which President Clinton and Congress 
expressed evident sympathy with Ronald Reagan’s concerns over an 
apocryphal “welfare queen.” See Gene Demby, The Truth Behind the Lies of 
the Original ‘Welfare Queen,’ NPR (Dec. 20, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.npr. 
org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/12/20/255819681/the-truth-behind-the-lies-of-the-
original-welfare-queen. 
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impediments do this, they impede not only fairness, but efficiency as 
well. For in the realm of insurance at least, justice and optimal 
efficiency are by and large—not completely, but by and large—
coextensive.29 
In this Part, I further explicate and, in so doing, substantiate 
that claim. This should ultimately assist with the task of articulating just 
why it is that we wish—and if possible ought—to do something for 
Bob and Barbara. The strategy I’ll employ is to exploit certain close 
structural parallels that subsist between justice and insurance. For 
justice theory and insurance theory are, I shall argue, quite intimately 
linked.30 
It is somewhat surprising that the linkage I reference is not 
more commonly remarked or systematically explored in the ethical or 
economic literatures.31 For probably the best way to characterize the 
remarkable progress made in justice theory since the mid-twentieth 
century is as the gradually dawning—though still inchoate and 
incomplete—recognition that justice itself is best understood as a kind 
of insurance.32 And probably the best way to understand truly efficient 
insurance, as I shall show, is as (nearly) distributively just risk-
allocation.33 I adopt and examine these perspectives in turn. 
 
A. Justice as Insurance 
 
Justice is concerned with appropriate distributions of benefits 
and burdens over persons.34 That suggests at least three constitutive 
concerns of justice theory, each taking as a point of departure one of the 
words I’ve just used. 
First comes the word “appropriate.” That implicates what I call 
the “pattern” or “formula” pursuant to which one’s account of justice 
                                                 
29 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 195-96. 
30 See id. at 184. 
31 The subjects are at least considered together, even if in ultimately 
unsatisfactory, fragmentary fashion, in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING 
RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).  
32 See infra Part II.A; see also Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 202. 
33 See infra Part II.B; Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 195-96. 
34 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1187; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 5 & n.14. For a 
caveat about “persons,” see infra note 37.  
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maintains that we ought to distribute.35 Next come the words “benefit” 
and “burden.” Those implicate what I call the “distribuenda,” or 
“objects of distribution,” that one’s account of justice takes for ethically 
salient. 36 Finally comes the word “persons.” This implicates those 
whom I call the “distribuees,” or “recipients” of benefits and burdens 
that one’s account of justice takes for ethically salient.37   
Justice theory has tended toward, and in my own work I 
endeavor to complete, a convergence upon the following values as 
those that best fill the variables just elaborated.38 
 
1. Distribution Formulae 
 
First, the appropriate distribution formula seems to be that 
which equalizes across persons such benefits and burdens as for which 
we are not responsible, and to allow our outcomes therefore to vary 
solely and precisely with such variable efforts as for which we are 
responsible.39 While it can, of course, be difficult to sort between these 
sources of well-faring and ill-faring in specific cases—conducting an 
ethically critical process that I think of as “justice-accounting,” or 
                                                 
35 See infra Part II.A.1; see also Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, 
supra note 22, at 1187; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, 
at 19. 
36 See infra Part II.A.3; see also Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, 
supra note 22, at 1220-58; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 
15, at 15. 
37 See infra Part II.A.2; see also Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, 
supra note 22, at 1216-19; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 
15, at 22-28. I don’t take a position here as to whether persons must be human, 
whether they must be adult, whether they must be individuals rather than 
collectivities such as ethnic groups or nation states, etc. For more on those 
kinds of considerations, see Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra 
note 22, at 1216-19. 
38 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1318; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 93-94.  
39 See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 58-59. Our 
outcomes and our responsible efforts, of course, often will be mediated by some 
form of recompense—“payment”—from others for those efforts. See Hockett, 
Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1320-21. This conception of 
justice therefore incorporates a role for social value—the valuing and disvaluing 
by others of what we do or fail to do. See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, 
at 143. It is that mediation that renders this conception friendly to efficiency, as 
further noted below. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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“responsibility-tracing”—as a rough and ready matter, the distinction 
seems clear enough.40   
This view of the appropriate distribution formula is sometimes 
referred to as the “‘responsibility-tracking,’ or ‘luck’ egalitarian[]” 
ideal.41 I prefer to call it “opportunity-egalitarian,” with the proviso that 
opportunity must be understood in decidedly material, not just formal, 
terms.42 “Opportunity” in this sense is roughly synonymous with 
“exogenously given resource.”43   
The guiding intuition on this understanding of justice is to 
equalize “brute luck” or fortune over persons, while allowing differ-
ential diligence, including differential “option luck”—that is, fortune 
consequent upon choices for which agents are responsible, such as the 
outcomes of voluntarily undertaken gambles or insurance purchases—
to result in differential outcomes.44 We can think of this as a matter of 
treating luck or fortune as what I call “ethically exogenous,” and 
treating responsibility as what I call “ethically endogenous.”45  
Please note the friendliness, on this conception, of justice to 
efficiency—i.e., to the production, via what counts as “diligence,” of 
social value, or “wealth.”46 Note its friendliness also, for much the 
same reasons, to markets of certain sorts.  
                                                 
40 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1296-99; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 52-59. 
41 Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1259; see also 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 53. 
42 Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 52-59. 
43 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1238; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 25, 53; see also JOHN 
E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 24 (1998); Richard J. Arneson, 
Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77, 85 (1989); 
Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Oppor-
tunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158, 175-77 (1990); G. A. Cohen, On 
the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 916 (1989).  
44 Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1306-07. 
45 Id. at 1219; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 38 
n.62. 
46 For more on “wealth” as efficiency, see of course J. R. Hicks, The Founda-
tions of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 701 (1939); J. R. Hicks, The 
Valuation of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105, 122 (1940); Nicholas 
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 549-50 (1939); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and 
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 
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2. Distribuees 
 
The opportunity-egalitarian view of the proper distribution 
formula as just described dovetails with a view of distribuees as 
responsible agents or active “subjects,” as distinguished from mere 
patients or passive “objects.”47 We take the ethically relevant recipients 
of benefits and burdens, for purposes of just distribution, to be “active 
forgers” of parts of their fates rather than mere passive victims or 
beneficiaries of fortuity or charity.48   
The reason that this conception of distribuees dovetails with 
the opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula is that it only makes 
sense to trace responsibility in our distribution formula if we view those 
who receive distributions as being capable of responsibility.49 And that 
is just what it is to call them responsible agents.  Responsible agents’ 
well- or ill-faring is a function in part of what they do, and in part of 
what they have.50 What they have in turn is itself partly attributable to 
what they do, but also partly attributable to what they “are dealt.”51   
The opportunity egalitarian ideal just is to equalize what agents 
“are dealt,” while honoring—and holding them accountable in justice 
for—what they “do.”52 
                                                                                                       
HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Econo-
mics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 124 (1979). 
47 Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1241-42; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-28. 
48 Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1241; see also 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-28. 
49 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1235-36; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-24. 
50 Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1235-36; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-24. 
51 Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1235-36; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-24. Again, there is 
no claim that these two “inputs” to well- or ill-faring are easily disentangled in 
practice. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The claim is simply that 
they are analytically distinguishable and ethically salient, which suggests in 
turn that it is worth looking for means of separately tracing them in practice. 
For proposals of such means, see generally ROEMER, supra note 43. See also 
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1296-99; Hockett, 
Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 52-59. 
52 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1235-36; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-24. See also the 
caveat registered supra note 51.   
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3. Distribuenda 
 
These views of appropriate distribution formulae and recipi-
ents of distribution dovetail with a view of the ethically salient 
distribuenda—sometimes called the “currency” of justice53—as 
ethically exogenous benefits and burdens, or material opportunities and 
risks. We can also think of these as exogenously given resources in the 
one case, and as handicaps or deficits in the other.54  
Distribuees are responsible for making their own happiness of 
their opportunities, which accordingly constitute a kind of “raw 
material” or “resource” employed in the production of individual 
“welfare.”55 Distribuees also are responsible for making additional 
opportunities of such raw materials as they are dealt.56 Finally they also 
are responsible for providing against and mitigating, so far as they are 
able, such risks or harms as they are dealt.57 But, by definition, they are 
not responsible for what they are not able to provide against or to 
mitigate.58   
 
4. Distribution Mechanisms 
 
Perhaps the best way to explicate more comprehensively the 
linkage among distributive patterns, benefits and burdens, and 
recipients is by reference to a particular mechanism that distributes the 
right things to the right people in appropriate quantities. Please note, as 
I proceed along these lines, how a fuller visualization of this sort begins 
to suggest a specific institutional embodiment—an embodiment not 
unlike that referenced earlier in introducing this essay and further 
schematized below.59 
                                                 
53 See generally Cohen, supra note 43; see also Hockett, Deep Grammar of 
Distribution, supra note 22, at 1234. 
54 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1203; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 15-16. 
55 Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1236; Hockett, 
Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 26. 
56 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1236; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 26. 
57 See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 31-32. 
58 See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1219; 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 81.  
59 See infra Part IV. 
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Intuitively, then, the simplest way simultaneously to equalize 
ethically exogenous endowments on the one hand while holding people 
responsible for the product of their ethically endogenous decisions on 
the other would seem to be this: Afford everyone equal shares of 
everything at time t0 and then both (a) allow them to trade toward 
welfare-maximizing equilibria from those identical initial “baskets” of 
resources, while (b) trading contingent compensatory claims upon one 
another to provide against welfare-risks that can eventuate at any time 
tn>0.60 (The mentioned risks are future contingencies about which all 
have equal—in fact, no—knowledge and control at t0.) 
Note how this mechanism embodies the opportunity-egali-
tarian understanding of appropriate distribution formula, distribuee, and 
distribuenda just elaborated. The resources at t0 are ethically 
exogenous—they’re “given”—hence they are equalized.61The trades 
that are subsequently made are voluntarily made by responsible agents, 
who are accordingly responsible for what they have after each of them. 
Finally, because contingent claims-trading also can be done—pursuant 
to which trading agents provide against unpleasant future contingencies 
by foregoing present goods for future compensation should unpleasant 
things occur—even some future, exogenously occurring misfortunes 
now are “endogenized” in such a way as simultaneously enables 
responsible agents to “take responsibility” for them and thereby 
“become responsible” for them.62 
Justice, then, on this view of distribuees, distribuenda, and 
appropriate distribution formulae, is a kind of ongoing, life-long market 
in goods, services, and insurance, the participants in which market are 
equally endowed with knowledge and control over future contin-
gencies. It is the ever-fluctuating outcome of an iterated set of fair 
trades freely conducted by materially equally-situated parties,63 some of 
whom are willing to purchase, at the price of consumption forgone 
now, contingent future compensation from others, who themselves 
perhaps prefer more consumption now, in the event that undesired 
fortuities should occur later. 
                                                 
60 See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 74-78.  
61 See supra notes 44-45. 
62 See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 25-26. 
63 Please bear in mind that “equally” here pertains only to the ethically 
exogenous, endowment-originating portion of one’s holdings, pursuant to the 
“luck-egalitarian” conception described above. See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text.  
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William Vickrey, John Harsanyi, and other “veiled” utilitarians 
evidently were groping toward some such image as this.64 The “veil of 
ignorance”65 that they used to justify utilitarian distribution principles 
was in essence a contrived equalization of the informational and 
resource endowment, under which circumstance, these thinkers 
thought, parties all “would” purchase the utilitarian “policy,” i.e., the 
aggregate- or average-utility-maximizing distribution formula.66   
John Rawls essentially did the same thing, but imputed a 
different choice of distribution formula, namely the “difference 
principle” as implemented via the maximin formula, pursuant to which 
the prospects of the least well off would trump those of everyone else.67 
In both cases the imputations entailed, in effect, attributions of extreme 
attitudes toward risk to the “insurers”—Rawls an extreme aversion to 
risk, Harsanyi et al. an extreme foolhardiness toward the same.68   
Ronald Dworkin, more exactingly, thought through the likely 
choices of insurers on the basis of behavior observable in actual 
insurance markets—the insurance metaphor at last was recognized 
explicitly and taken seriously—but again the choices were, in the final 
                                                 
64 See generally, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics 
and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 434 (1953) 
[hereinafter Cardinal Utility]; John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individu-
alistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 
(1955) [hereinafter Cardinal Welfare]; William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and 
Social Decision Rules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1960). 
65 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999). 
66 In the 1953 paper, Harsanyi “proved” that agents conforming to the axioms 
of von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory would agree to 
maximize aggregate utility. See generally Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility, supra 
note 64. In the 1955 paper, he “proved” that they would agree to maximize 
average utility. See generally Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, supra note 64.  
67 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72-73 (rev. ed. 1999); see also Hockett, 
Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1202. 
68 See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW & LEONID HURWICZ, STUDIES IN RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION PROCESSES 463-71 (1977) (finding that maximin scores a perfect 
“1” on the pessimism index); GEOFFREY A. JEHLE & PHILIP J. RENY, 
ADVANCED MICROECONOMIC THEORY 260 (2d ed. 2001); Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 
245, 256-57 (1973) (book review); John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin 
Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory, 
69 AM POL. SCI. REV. 594, 595-96 (1975). One might say that Rawls’s 
distribuees are effectively treated as implausibly risk-averse, while Harsanyi’s 
distribuees were effectively treated as implausibly risk-cavalier.  
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analysis, imputed.69 “One size” was selected to “fit all.” And though, 
presumably, it did fit more, there must of course be many whom the 
garment does not clothe.70   
This invites an obvious question: What if we could offer 
actual, rather than imputed, choices to our agents as self-insurers? 
Might we get our sizing straight? Might we offer actual insurance that 
works the same justice-magic as the likes of Vickrey, Harsanyi, Rawls, 
and Dworkin seemed to sense intuitively it might?   
Before turning to that prospect, I’d like to examine the justice/ 
insurance relation from the other—the insurance—side of the disciplin-
ary divide. For this will both further illuminate the underlying unity of 
justice and insurance, and take us more readily appreciably back, 
through examination of the current practice of insurance, to the 
concrete reality faced by Bob and his family above in Part I. 
 
B. Insurance as Justice 
 
Insurance is a means of pooling, generally through market 
exchange, broad classes of risk, the eventuation of which, in relation to 
the pool’s risk-bearers as a whole, are reasonably affordable, while in 
relation to all or most risk-bearers taken as individuals, are not.71 
Herewith, of course, is the source of insurance’s capacity to both 
effectuate and allocate risk-bearing more efficiently.72   
                                                 
69 Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 283, 314-23 (1981). 
70 See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of 
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Dworkin, supra note 69; see also 
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY (2000) (reprinting previous two articles and subsequent writing). In 
comparison to Rawls and Harsanyi as characterized supra note 68 and 
accompanying text, one might say that Dworkin’s imputed choices are more 
carefully argued, attempting to get things “just right.” But I argue here that a 
better answer is, if possible, simply to leave-off imputing choices altogether, 
and make a serious effort at affording actual choice.         
71 See, e.g., Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 184-85. 
72 One can hardly improve upon the venerable Adam Smith in this context: 
“The trade of insurance gives great security to the fortunes of private people, 
and by dividing among a great many that loss which would ruin an individual, 
makes it fall light and easy upon the whole society.” 5 ADAM SMITH, AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 281 
(Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776). 
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If each of us is a farmer, each has a barn upon which his 
livelihood depends, and each of us stands a one in one hundred chance 
of losing his barn to a fire, most of us will be tempted to save much 
more than one-hundredth of the replacement cost of a barn given how 
much each depends on his barn. We will thus set aside in aggregate 
much more than the actuarial value of the risk we collectively face.73 If 
on the other hand we can pool risk together, we’ll set aside no more 
than that actuarial value, and each of us will chip-in merely one one-
hundredth of the cost of a barn.74 
That’s one of the senses in which insurance brings greater 
efficiency—in effect solving a collective action problem and thereby 
minimizing aggregate (“social”) cost.75 The other sense is this:  If some 
of those in the hypothetical are more risk-welcoming than others, they 
will be willing to cover the risk of lost barns for less compensation than 
will others.76 If an insurance market facilitates or simulates sale of that 
“covering” service by the risk-welcoming to the risk-fearing, then we 
will yet further minimize aggregate (“social”) cost. For risk will be 
borne by those most ready and least expensively able to bear it.   
 
1. Prerequisites to Efficient Insurance  
 
Now, the very characterization just offered implicitly carries 
three well-known prerequisites to efficiently operating, long-term-
sustainable insurance markets. As we shall see, moreover, with one 
caveat, the same practical measures as ensure that those prerequisites 
are met actually facilitate a just, not only an efficient, distribution of 
risk.77 Practically efficient insurance and just risk-distribution, in other 
words, are near extensional equivalents. 
 
                                                 
73 Cf. Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1250. 
74 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 185. 
75 Id.  
76 Cf. Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1273 
(“[T]here is a host of institutions . . . all of which exist, in part, to facilitate the 
transfer of risk from those less willing to bear it to those who are more 
willing.”). 
77 See infra Part II.B.2. 
2014-2015 REAL ARROW-SECURITIES FOR ALL 631 
 
 
a. Event Independence 
 
First, then, insured events must be what we call “independent 
of,” or “orthogonal to,” one another.78 For risk-pooling to work, risk 
must actually eventuate for but a small fraction, at most, of the risk 
pool.79 The ex ante “probability of an insured event’s befalling one 
prospective member of the risk pool” must therefore be orthogonal to its 
befalling another such prospective member.80 Wavelike, catastrophic, 
covarying events (within the pool) generally are not insurable.81   
To recur to the barn story, if the barns are all near one another 
such that one barn’s burning will likely occasion every barn’s burning, 
there is no way for our barn-owners to insure among themselves. For 
there will be no unaffected farmer able to subsidize the affected 
farmer(s) in rebuilding after the blaze.  
 
b.  Event Estimatability 
 
Second, insured events must be what we call “determinable” 
and “estimatable,” or “priceable.”82 The insured event first must be 
well defined, its occurrence readily verified, so that we know with 
reasonable certainty when it has transpired.83 And then the probability 
and cost—”probable cost”—of the event’s eventuation must also be 
more or less ascertainable ex ante.84 Otherwise we don’t know quite 
what we’re insuring, how to know when payouts are due, or of course 
what to pay out or, therefore, assess in the way of premia ex ante.85  
                                                 
78 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 186-87. 
79 See id. at 187. 
80 See id. 
81 See, e.g., KARL H. BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 163-74 (Knut K. 
Aase & Agnar Sandmo eds., 1990); J. FRANCOIS OUTREVILLE, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 132-33 (1998); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. 
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 43 (11th ed. 2014); 
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 187; see also ANDREU MAS-COLELL 
ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 167-208, 436-73 (1995); DAVID M. KREPS, 
A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 71-124, 577-715 (1990); HAL R. 
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 172-94 (3d ed. 1992). 
82 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 187-88. 
83 Id. at 188. 
84 Id. at 187-88. 
85 See, e.g., OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 132-33; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, 
supra note 81, at 42; see also KENNETH J. ARROW, Insurance, Risk, and 
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c. Event-Informational Symmetry 
 
Finally, information among prospective insurers and insureds 
must be more or less what we call “symmetrically” distributed.86 (Note 
the cross-resonance between “symmetry” here and “equality” when 
speaking of justice above.87) Insurer and insured must be, in other 
words, more or less equally informationally endowed with respect to 
the salient risk that is being insured against.88   
There are two commonly remarked vitiating consequences of 
asymmetrically distributed information. Please note the ethically 
pregnant, justice-resonant language of the two terms of art that we 
commonly employ in naming these consequences. 
One such consequence is that known as “adverse (or “anti-”) 
selection.”89 Where the insured is positioned to know more about the 
probability of the insured event’s occurrence than is the insurer, 
insurers come to fear selection-bias on the part of those seeking 
                                                                                                       
Resource Allocation, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE 
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 77, 84-85 (1984) [hereinafter Insurance, Risk, 
and Resource Allocation]; KREPS, supra note 81, at 661-79; MAS-COLELL ET 
AL., supra note 81, at 460-67; VARIAN, supra note 81, at 42-45; 180-81. 
Note that we can sum-up the requirements stated in Part II.B.1.a-b as 
follows: It is a commonplace that the insurance premium P for insured event 
i—Pi –must be equal to the probability of the insured event’s occurring—πi—
multiplied by the loss that will thereby be occasioned—Li—and by an 
administrative cost—a. In short, Pi = (1+a)πiLi. Now if the probability of the 
event’s occurring is certain, such that πi = 1, then Pi = (1+a)Li, and the 
premium exceeds the loss. If πi is unknown, on the other hand, there will be no 
Pi at all.  
86 Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 189. 
87 See supra Part II.A. 
88 See, e.g., BORCH, supra note 81, at 315-30; KREPS, supra note 81, at 625-
650; MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 81, at 437-50; OUTREVILLE, supra note 
81, at 166-67; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 81, at 42-45; VARIAN, 
supra note 81, at 466-70; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and 
Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 10 (1974); Kenneth J. Arrow, Risk 
Allocation and Information: Some Recent Theoretical Developments, GENEVA 
PAPERS ON RISK & INS.—ISSUES & PRAC., June 1978, at 5, 6; Michael 
Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: 
An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 648 
(1976). 
89 Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 189. 
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insurance.90 Expecting the worst, they accordingly charge higher 
premia or withdraw from the market altogether.91 Familiar expressions 
such as “Gresham’s Law” (“bad [risks] drive[] out the good”), the 
“market for lemons,” and the like all allude to circumstances in which 
adverse selection is operative.92 
The other archetypal information asymmetry situation is that 
involving so-called “moral hazard.”93 (The ethical valence of the idea 
could not be more clearly conveyed.) Here the insured not only better 
knows or is able to conceal the relevant probability that determines the 
actuarial value or disvalue of the insured event, but is able actually to 
manipulate or affect it.94 Insureds might, for example, slacken efforts to 
avoid risk’s eventuation, or even act to bring it about, owing to 
potentially perverse incentive effects of insurance itself.95 
 
                                                 
90 Id. at 189-90. 
91 Id. at 190. 
92 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970). For a more general and 
formal discussion, see generally Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, 
Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously 
Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985). 
To recur to the formulaic treatment at supra note 85, efficiency also 
“requires” that, for persons 1 & 2, Pi1 > Pi2 if πi1 > πi2. But if all pay Pi2, 
then there will be insufficient supply, while if all must pay Pi1, there will be 
insufficient demand. 
93 Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 190. 
94 See, e.g., ARROW, Insurance, Risk, and Resource Allocation, supra note 85, 
at 85; BORCH, supra note 81, at 325-30; OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 133-
34, 179-80; J. Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and 
Information—An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1375, 1389-91 
(1979); see generally Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: 
Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968). 
In terms of the formulaic summation at supra note 85, moral hazard 
brings about a state in which πi = 1, or at any rate in which πi > Pi/(1+a)L, 
such that the premium exceeds the loss and thus renders the market impossible 
to maintain. 
95 Such was of course a principal reason offered for Congress’s passage of the 
PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). It’s as if they were thinking of Reagan’s 
apocryphal “welfare queen.” See Demby, supra note 28.  
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2.  Methods for Meeting the Prerequisites: 
Optimizing is Fairness-Restoring  
 
There are several commonly employed practical means—some 
introduced by insurers and permitted by law, others afforded more 
directly by the law itself—of ensuring that the three prerequisites to 
efficient insurability obtain. Note that, with one critical exception, the 
same means as render insurance efficient render risk-distribution more 
just. 
  
a. Pool-Universalizing and 
Behaviorally  Risk-Segmenting 
 
Event independence is optimized in two ways. First, we 
broaden—ideally, we universalize—the risk pool.96 The broader the 
pool, the lesser the likelihood of covariance.97 Also, however, the 
broader the pool, the more just the risk distribution—at least if the 
insured event is ethically exogenous, such that no one is responsible for 
its occurrence. Second, and partly because of that last observation, we 
separate-off—we “segment,” or “classify”—risks that we come in time 
to recognize consistently to co-vary, i.e., to be “caused” in their 
eventuation by, known “risk-factors.”98 The progress of knowledge, 
then, tends over time to bring progress to insurance.99   
                                                 
96 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 191. 
97 Id. at 191-92. 
98 See id. at 196 & n.205. 
99 See OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 132; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 
81, at 36. Universalizing of this sort, incidentally, is precisely what the so-
called “Obamacare mandate” is meant to do. It works to render American 
health insurance simultaneously more just and efficient by roping everyone 
into the risk pool, such that we cross-subsidize one another as justice would 
mandate and efficiency would require. For more on this, see generally Hockett, 
Making Sense, supra note 6.   
Broader pooling also improves estimatability, through the operation 
of the “law of large numbers.” See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 81, at 
36; infra Part II.B.2.b. On risk-classification, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY 
L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 16-
18 (1999); OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 150-51. See generally Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 
403 (1985). Formally, discovery of more fine-grained “statistical or microsta-
tistical (‘causal’) relations between subfeatures γ and δ of events Γ and Δ, for 
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Now note that universalizing the risk pool, at least with respect 
to truly exogenous—unavoidable—risks, is precisely what would be 
mandated by justice.100 Note also that separating-off risks that are, 
through responsible or diligent behavior, avoidable or mitigable also is 
mandated by justice.101 Universalizing the pool of ethically exogenous 
risk-bearing is mandated by justice’s luck-equalizing imperative, while 
segmenting ethically endogenous, fault-worthy risk-incurring is 
mandated by justice’s responsibility-tracing imperative.102 
Now note as well that our law tends to authorize—in some 
cases even to mandate—his form of segmentation. There are few if any 
legal restrictions upon so-called “bonus/malus” premium structuring 
(again, please note the morally charged connotation of this insurance 
term of art).103 There is no legal impediment, in other words, to pricing 
pursuant to which, e.g., unsafe drivers or smokers are charged more by 
the insurance industry.104 Note also that the one form of risk-
segmentation that would offend justice—segmenting on the basis of 
ineluctable traits—often, though perhaps not often enough(!), tends to 
be regarded with suspicion by the law. The classic case here is the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of genetic information by 
health insurers and employers.105 
                                                                                                       
example, will render the degree of covariance between Γ and Δ more 
predictable; one might, upon such discovery, find that [Γ\ γ and Δ\ δ] can be 
separately insured because it is only γ and δ that covary.” Hockett, Just 
Insurance, supra note 3, at 191-92. That is, entire classes of such subfeatures 
might indeed be separately insurable. See id.  
100 See supra Part II.A. 
101 See supra Part II.A. 
102 See supra text accompanying notes 39-45. 
103 See BORCH, supra note 81, at 299-300. 
104 See id. 
105 It will then simulate “leveling down”—prohibiting, in the idiom of supra 
note 99 the use of certain subclasses of “Γ\ γ and Δ\ δ” information. See 
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 198-99. On risk-classification, see 
supra note 98-99 and accompanying text. On its injustice in the genetic 
informational context, see generally, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM 
CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE (2000); JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN 
GENOME PROJECT (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lappé eds., 1994); 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Medical Information and Medical Insurance: An Ethical 
Dilemma? (1994) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). On the 
(il)legality of risk-classification predicated on genetic information, see 
generally, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
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b. Pool-Universalizing and Learning  
 
Turning from event independence to determinability and 
probable cost estimatability, these too are affected, as is event 
independence, by the advancement of scientific knowledge and the 
broadening of risk pools, both of which phenomena go significantly 
hand in hand.106 Broadening the risk pool tends to result in 
standardization of contracts, liquidity in the insurance market, and 
sharpening of the definitions of insured events.107 It also tends to 
“incentivize” the collection of additional data on the precise causes and 
likelihoods of insured events’ eventuation.108   
Now note that precisely the same means tend to facilitate what 
I call the “justice-accounting” implicitly required by the opportunity-
egalitarian ideal in justice theory.109 That ideal requires careful tracing 
of the results of, and thus of the precise boundary line between, what is 
ethically exogenous and beyond control or anticipation on the one 
hand, and what is ethically endogenous and within our ken and capacity 
on the other.110 Learning more over time about what factors tend to 
cause what harms against which we wish to insure enables us to also 
better determine, over time, what people can do—hence what they can 
subsequently be held responsible for doing—to minimize their own 
risks.111 
 
c. Mandatory Disclosure and 
Simulated Shared Opacity  
 
Turning finally to symmetric information, this is, in the 
insurance context—where neither insureds nor insurers have conferred 
ethically endogenous benefits upon one another such as would warrant 
a departure from the ethically exogenous equality baseline—simply 
equally shared information.112 The methods typically employed to 
                                                                                                       
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, 
and 42 U.S.C). 
106 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 192. 
107 See id. 
108 See, e.g., OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 132-33; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, 
supra note 81, at 36.  
109 See supra text accompanying note 40. 
110 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
111 See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 192-93. 
112 See id. at 189, 192-93. 
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combat the effects of asymmetric information and thus render insurance 
efficiently providable, accordingly, also tend to render information- 
and risk-distribution more just. 
There are two broad classes of such methods—what we might 
call “leveling-up” and “leveling-down.”113 These too have emerged 
from insurance practice and the law alike. Leveling-up is effected by 
means of transparency rules—e.g., rights to pre-inspection,114 or the 
“disclose” component of the SEC’s “disclose or abstain” reading of 
Rule 10b-5.115 Leveling-down is effected by means of what I call 
“simulated shared opacity”116—e.g., express or implied warranties, 
preexisting condition clauses,117 or the “abstain” component of the 
SEC’s aforementioned reading of Rule 10b-5.118 Simulated shared 
opacity also is, of course, simply the imposition of a “veil of ignor-
ance,” our friend from justice theory mentioned above.119   
Note that “leveling-up” methods tend to enhance both justice 
and efficiency.120 Only “leveling-down” methods might be thought to 
diminish, to some extent, efficiency conceived as wealth-maximization 
in some contexts.121 It must be stressed in this connection, however, 
that the effect here would tend to be ambiguous, in light of both (a) the 
                                                 
113 Id. at 199-200.  
114 See, e.g., VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 81, at 18, 135; Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 962 (1963). On legal doctrines, see Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C). Note that “preexisting 
condition” clauses covering genetic traits might offend justice. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg-53(c) (2012). 
115 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2014). 
116 Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 198-99. 
117 See, e.g., ARROW, Insurance, Risk, and Resource Allocation, supra note 85, 
at 84-85; BORCH, supra note 81, at 319; OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 150-
52; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 81, at 354, 586. See generally Kenneth 
J. Arrow, Optimal Insurance and Generalized Deductibles, 74 SCANDINAVIAN 
ACTUARIAL J. 1 (1974). 
118 Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 198-99. 
119 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.   
120 Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 200. 
121 Id. 
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ethical irrelevance of wealth produced by unjust means122 and (b) the 
demoralization and/or resentment effects that injustice can bring.123 
(For example, a commonly offered efficiency-justification for the 
SEC’s “disclose or abstain” rule is that participants will withdraw from, 
hence deliquify and render less efficient, a market that they think 
unfair.124) 
So we see that, from the insurance side of the justice/insurance 
dyad just as surely as from the justice side, risk-distributive justice and 
efficient insurance can be seen to be by and large co-extensive. And 
from the insurance side, we begin to get a glimmer of the very concrete, 
practical means that might be employed to render the distribution of at 
least one distribuendum—risk—both more just and more efficient. This 
takes us back to Bob and Barbara. 
 
III. The Injustice and Inefficiency in Our Earlier Story: All for 
Want of Insurance125  
 
Back to Bob and Barbara. So suppose now that Bob and 
Barbara had wished somehow to insure, back in the late 1980s or early 
1990s as they began their careers, against what is now befalling them 
and their family. Of course, the unavailability of such insurance as we 
shall discuss would render it somewhat surprising for Bob or Barbara 
                                                 
122 See Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe, supra note 22, at 412; 
Hockett, Pareto Versus Welfare, supra note 22, at 25 n.44; Hockett, Taking 
Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 31. 
123 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 1 (expanded ed. 
1997) (“That a perceived sense of inequity is a common ingredient of rebellion 
in societies is clear enough . . . .”). 
124 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, On the Moral Structure of White Collar 
Crime, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 301, 319 (2007). 
125 Parts III-V again draw from my article Just Insurance Through Global 
Macro-Hedging: Information, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New 
Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk-Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading 
in a “New Economy.” See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 218-33, 
238-56. As explained previously, though, my work in Just Insurance was more 
formal and technical. See supra text accompanying note 4. Here, on the other 
hand, I intend to make the conclusions of Just Insurance in a more accessible 
manner, supra text accompanying note 4, and thus the degree to which the 
present language traces the language in Just Insurance will vary. Again, I 
thank the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law and 
reiterate its retention of the rights relating to this material.  
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even to consider it. The imaginative space in which demands are 
formed is itself partly a function of what already is supplied—invention 
often mothers perceived necessity much as necessity mothers inven-
tion. But ignore that for the moment. The question here is, why is there 
in fact no supply of such insurance as Bob and Barbara might use even 
for them so much as to imagine or begin to exploit?  
 
A. Inefficient Because the Prerequisites Aren’t Met 
 
The reasons are rooted in those prerequisites to efficient 
insurance rehearsed just above.126 
 
1. Local Income and Home Price Covariance  
 
Many of the principal sources of income- and asset-value-loss 
to people like Bob and Barbara give rise to classic covariance 
problems. Those include sectoral, regional, or general macroeconomic 
downturns or obsolescence, associated demographic trends, and so on 
as described in connection with Bob’s and Barbara’s value-added, their 
particular occupations, their home-valuation, and so on, as described in 
Part I. Unless Bob and Barbara can access a risk-pool well beyond their 
local and vocational environments, then, their insurance potential will 
be quite limited.127 For their neighbors and colleagues likely are 
suffering many of the same losses as they are suffering. 
 
2. Extended-Event Nonpriceability 
 
Insured event determinability and probable cost estimatability 
also are problematic in Bob’s and Barbara’s case. With respect to 
                                                 
126 See supra Part II.B.1. 
127 See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
AND RISK SHARING 136 (1994) (“Most individual[‘s] primary asset is their 
human capital. This is subject to significant fluctuations in value as industries 
grow and decline. . . . Those people who have nontransferable skills have 
suffered a large uninsured capital loss.”); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING 258-59 (1985) (discussing the extent to which labor is 
nondiversifiable); Donald F. Gordon, A Neo-classical Theory of Keynesian 
Unemployment, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 431, 443 (1974) (“One cannot . . . sell a 
piece of oneself if one is a lawyer in Cincinnati and buy a portion of a 
carpenter in San Diego.”). 
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determinability, notice that the would-be insured event is not some 
singular, salient, dramatic, one-off affair—e.g., a fire or death—such as 
might easily be individuated and verified in the occurrence. It is a 
multifactorial, protracted affair, rather like the case of the proverbial 
frog in the gradually heating water. 
As for probable cost estimatability, the cost factor is not 
terribly difficult—it’s simply the lost income or asset-value—but 
probability is a different story. In the absence of careful trend-watching 
over a lengthy period, the results of which watching are readily 
accessible both to would-be insurers and to Barbara and Bob, the risk 
here is going to be quite indefinite as a matter of magnitude. At least 
that is so ex ante, which is of course the relevant temporal perspective 
from the point of view of insurance. 
Were a market for such insurance already to exist and be 
highly liquid, there would of course be incentives for the ferreting-out 
and publication—at least in the form of observable prices impounding 
it—of such information. There might, in other words, be “price 
discovery.” But there is not yet such a market. Another case, then, this 
one—like supply and demand—of “chicken and egg.” 
 
3. Classic Information Asymmetry 
 
The asymmetric information problems in our story are even 
worse than the covariance and non-priceability problems. Bob’s and 
Barbara’s prospective insurer, had they approached her in hopes of 
purchasing a policy covering what is now happening to them, would 
have been apt to wonder whether Bob and Barbara knew something 
that she did not. After all, that insurer would, in view of the observation 
made just above, have to be located, or have access to many others 
located, outside of Bob’s locality, and probably wouldn’t be a small 
town lawyer. So Bob is of course better situated than his prospective 
insurer to know what his town’s and his practice’s long term prospects 
are. And the prospective insurer will know this. So that prospective 
insurer, recognizing a possible adverse selection bias, will be reluctant 
to insure Bob.  
The moral hazard problem is yet more acute, at least with 
respect to Bob’s and Barbara’s incomes and perhaps to some extent 
even with respect to the value of their home. After all, if the insurance 
policy is drafted in terms of income and home valuation alone—which 
it will have to be, absent a readily accessed locus of more “macro”-
oriented, fluctuating data such as small town lawyers’ income trends 
and small town homes’ valuational trends more generally—what is to 
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keep Bob’s and Barbara’s incomes or home value from dropping 
simply owing to their own negligence? Our prospective insurer faces a 
classic moral hazard risk, the monitoring against which will likely be 
prohibitively expensive both as a legal and as a logistical matter.128 
 
B. Unjust Because Inefficient: What Impedes 
Insurance Impedes Fairness as Well  
 
Notice that a private market for insurance against Bob’s and 
Barbara’s fate, apparently rendered impossible by the factors just 
rehearsed, is missing through no fault of Bob’s, Barbara’s, or their 
prospective insurer’s. Bob and Barbara are perfectly honest and 
diligent, their prospective insurer presumably ready to insure them, up 
to a point, if only she can trust them and her own powers of assessing 
likely risks such as those that faced Bob and Barbara, then quite 
remotely, in the later 1980s or early 1990s.129   
Our insurer, who either bets directly on people like Bob and 
Barbara or pools risks faced by many diverse people together as a 
financial intermediary, is a person of good will who is presumptively—
because she is an insurer—much better able to cover risks like Bob’s 
and Barbara’s than are Bob and Barbara, if, again, she only can trust 
them and feel relatively confident about the verifiability and real 
probable cost of their possible misfortunes. Moreover, were she able to 
be reimbursed by Bob and Barbara were their prospects to improve 
after initially dropping and bringing them an insurance payout—e.g., 
after a popular “communitarian” movement and disillusionment with 
metropolitan life begins to take people back to the towns—she might 
be even more willing to insure Bob and Barbara. 
It begins to look as though all that is really missing here, then, 
is not good will or a willingness to trade risks from those less 
efficiently to those more efficiently able to bear them. It is, rather, 
certain critical forms of information and a critical mass of prospective 
participants who, were they to be made vividly aware of the 
possibilities, would be willing themselves to constitute a market such as 
                                                 
128 See supra notes 28, 95 and accompanying text (discussing concerns raised 
in connection with Congress’s passage of the PRWORA). 
129 It is critical that we keep the temporal perspective in mind. We now have 
“20/20 hindsight” with respect to Bob himself. The present project is 
concerned more directly with the Bobs of the future, whom we cannot now 
readily identify, in order that they might avoid Bob’s quandary when things 
begin to unfold for them as they have done for Bob. 
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would begin to “incentivize” both the generation and the institutional 
concentration and deployment of that needed information. (“Chicken 
and egg” again.) What we have here, in other words, is perhaps in 
crucial part a classic problem of inertia and collective action, predicated 
upon a set of long-settled informational expectations. 
Patterns of expectation as to what is possible and what is not 
have developed around long-enduring—up to now—understandings of 
what is technologically feasible, in both an informational and in a legal 
sense, and what is not. We are accustomed to thinking of information 
such as bears upon Bob’s and Barbara’s income and wealth prospects 
as the sort of stuff that is gathered, if at all, only with long periodicity, 
and which is, again, if gathered at all, dispersed over varied, 
disconnected sites that do not “talk” to one another. 
Perhaps some government office keeps some of the 
information—e.g., home value trends from decade to decade. Perhaps 
the labor department keeps other bits of it—e.g., lawyers’ income 
trends from 15-year period to 15-year period. Perhaps the ABA keeps 
yet other bits—e.g., trends in profitable legal practice areas measured in 
20-year increments. 
And the legal forms taken by our transactions tend to reflect 
those settled expectations: We insurance-contract over singular, highly 
salient, one-off type events—events generally involving one or a fairly 
small number of persons, not many people, and taking place at one 
time, not over protracted periods. Paid insureds do not typically point to 
countless others in order to verify what has happened to them, or “give 
the money back” to insurers when their continuously unfolding 
fortunes gradually pick up for the better. 
But technological feasibility—in both the informational and 
legal senses—has changed:  It is now possible, quickly and repeatedly 
over time, to gather, amass and centrally locate all manner of data 
bearing upon peoples’ wealth-prospects in a manner previously unima-
gined. And legal technology has kept pace with information 
technology:  New kinds of contracts are continually being designed, 
such as enable people to take opposite sides of transactions on the basis 
of information that is of differential value-import to the counterparties. 
If the only thing standing in the way of exploiting these new 
technologies in order to supply currently missing markets is inertia or 
collective action challenge—everybody waiting for the others to act—
then we might, quite simply, realize terrific Pareto gains—everyone 
made better off—if we can but jump-start, collectively, the instituting 
of such markets. And if the understanding of justice offered above 
holds, according to which most of Bob’s and Barbara’s sufferings were 
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not reasonably foreseeable, hence not chargeable to their “diligence 
account,” and are in that sense undeserved, then the supply of such 
markets will represent, not only a substantial Pareto gain, but a critical 
justice gain. 
Let us now then visualize, a bit more concretely, the sort of 
instruments and markets that might be of benefit to Bob, Barbara, and 
those like them—indeed, to all of us who participate in “developed” 
economies. 
 
IV. Building Better Betting Markets: Wealth-, Income-, and 
Other Insurance for Barbara and Bob 
 
Let’s see, now, whether we might devise privately tradable 
social insurance by tying micro-insurance policies to macro-aggregates. 
Were we able to do that, we might enable a simultaneously more just 
and efficient distribution of risks over our population.  
  
A. Three New Sample “Democratized” Derivatives 
 
Picture, then, if you would, a new kind of hedging instrument 
and a new kind of market in such instruments. These instruments and 
markets are not fanciful extensions of current markets in exotic 
derivative securities. They simply are designed more with people like 
Bob and Barbara, rather than large conglomerate firms with 
Gargantuan portfolios of “value at risk,” in view. 
 
1. A “Small Practice Lawyer’s Income” 
Collar 
 
Assume the existence, for the moment, of an index of small 
practice lawyer income. Perhaps the ABA, perhaps the Labor 
Department, perhaps the IRS, perhaps some other institution tracks 
incomes of lawyers engaged in small private practice, aggregates them, 
and expresses them in terms of some arbitrarily-selected base year, as is 
familiarly done with the GDP, the CPI, and other such aggregate. 
Now imagine that we design a contract, either between Bob 
and some financial intermediary which pools the savings and risk-
provisions of multiple parties, or between Bob and some other 
counterparty from whom he purchases the contract on an organized 
exchange. The contract provides that, whenever at the end of some 
predetermined period—say a half-year, a month, or a week—the index 
rises above some pre-determined level, Bob must direct a payment 
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toward that intermediary. And it provides that, whenever the index falls 
below some pre-determined level, the intermediary directs a payment 
toward Bob. 
The “collar,” is, of course, analyzable in familiar derivative 
terms as the simultaneous sale of a call option and purchase of a put 
option on revenue generated by an asset.130  Here the “asset” simply is 
the index tracking Bob’s occupational prospects. Now Bob and his 
counterparties are of course required to maintain margin accounts with 
the intermediary or the broker on the envisaged exchange to guaranty 
performance. If clearing is effected frequently—e.g., daily per the 
“marked to market” system—the margin accounts need not be prohi-
bitively large. 
We can do much the same thing, of course, with Barbara’s 
income if we construct the right index. We might thereby construct, 
say, a “Small Business Accountant’s Income” Collar, or a “Small 
Business Executive Officer’s Income” Collar, or what have you. At 
present there are few obvious limitations on what we might construct. 
 
2. A “Small Town Domestic Product” Collar 
 
Imagine the instrument just described, but now with the 
pertinent index tracking the economic performance of Bob’s and 
Barbara’s town or of small towns more generally, suitably defined. 
When the index rises, Bob and Barbara pay out. When the index falls, 
their counterparties pay in. 
 
3. A “Regional (or Small Town) Real Estate 
Value” Collar 
 
Now think as before, but in this case with the relevant index 
tracking real estate values in the pertinent area or of the pertinent—e.g., 
“small town”—type. Again, Bob and Barbara pay out or receive pay-
ins, which vary countercyclically with the performance of the aggregate 
                                                 
130 Collar instruments have been proposed for the protection of returns on 
retirement investment accounts. See, e.g., Zvi Bodie, Financial Engineering 
and Social Security Reform, in RISK ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL 
SECURITY REFORM 291, 303-04 (John Y. Campbell & Martin Feldstein eds., 
2001); Martin Feldstein & Elena Ranguelova, Accumulated Pension Collars: 
A Market Approach to Reducing the Risk of Investment-based Social Security 
Reform, 15 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 149, 152 (2001); Gordon, supra note 7, at 
1564 & n.143. 
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to which his net worth is tied. Bob’s and Barbara’s cyclical net worth is 
“smoothed,” “collared.” They surrender some “upside” gains in return 
for lessening their “downside” losses. Their counterparties do the same. 
 
B. Yet More Definable Risks, Yet More Democratized 
Derivatives 
 
We can imagine many other such instruments. We can imagine 
parceling data in all manner of ways, all with a view to tying the 
aggregate of prospects upon which Bob and Barbara in effect “bet” 
more closely to the prospects of returns upon their human capital, their 
social capital (that of their town), their real property, and so on—in 
sum, to their full net worth. More such instruments will allow for a 
more “granularly” customized, more fully optimized, portfolio. There 
is, in effect, a sort of “contingent-consol-swap,”131 an iterated, ongoing 
bet between the parties in all of these cases.132 There is in this sense 
continuous, efficient, and, because it is voluntary, just risk-sharing. 
                                                 
131 “Swaps” are of course agreements pursuant to which parties entitled to 
particular income-streams trade those rights. See, e.g., GORDON J. ALEXANDER 
ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTING 405-10 (3d ed. 2001). “Consols” are 
perpetual annuities not often found in the U.S. but rather more familiar in 
Great Britain. Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 225 & n.255. 
132 The notion of an aggregate-associated hedging instrument, in this case a so-
called “macro” security, appears to have first been discussed in print by John 
F. Marshall et al., Hedging Business Cycle Risk with Macro Swaps and 
Options, 4 CONT’L BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 103 (1992). Marshall 
elaborates in John F. Marshall, Derivatives and Risk Management, in THE 
NEW TOOL SET: ASSESSING INNOVATIONS IN BANKING 79, 83 (1995). 
The idea is implicit, of course, in the failed attempt, prior to the stock 
market crash of October 1987, to market a CPI-derivative instrument. See 
Brian R. Horrigan, The CPI Futures Market: The Inflation Hedge That Won’t 
Grow, BUS. REV., May-June 1987, at 3, 4. The market crash itself and 
subsequent attenuation of inflationary threat might account for the failure of 
this market. See id. at 4-5. A similar story, also involving regulatory uncer-
tainty, unfolded in the case of another early consumer macro-derivative, the 
S&P-indexed CD. See generally Joseph P. Ogden, A Strategic Analysis of 
Stock Index-Linked CDs, in DERIVATIVES, REGULATION AND BANKING 193 
(Barry Schachter ed., 1997). 
The principal champion of markets in instruments tied to macro-
indices over the past two decades has surely been my mentor Robert Shiller. 
See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 98 (2012); 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
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In so far as there are willing counterparties, these effective 
“swaps” of asset-value-streams will, by definition, result in welfare 
gains for all. And insofar as they enable Bob and Barbara to mitigate 
the ravages of fortune over which they lack control, they will result 
both in justice gains with respect to risk-allocation, and in 
chargeability, through their “diligence accounts,” of Bob and Barbara 
both with some degree of responsibility to insure and with some degree 
of “constructive knowledge”—in the form of securities prices—of the 
likely longer term income-consequences of his choices. Let’s particu-
larize those observations a bit more, by reference to the prerequisites to 
just and efficient insurance described just above. 
 
C. How the “Democratized” Derivative Instruments 
Avoid the Usual Impediments to Just and Efficient 
Insurance 
 
Now note how these instruments and markets address the three 
classic insurance problems: 
  
1. Randomizing Covariance  
 
The instruments just pictured pair parties who are differently 
situated—people whose prospects are likely to counter-vary to one 
degree or another. We can enumerate all manner of pair and n-tuple of 
full or partial complements and substitutes within economies, counter-
varying regional or national economic performances themselves (Japan 
and Germany versus the US and UK, for example), and other magni-
tudes the varying of which will be tied to one degree or another with 
one’s net worth. 
Non-small-practice lawyers, for example, hoping to hedge 
their own income risks, are likely to be among Bob’s counterparties—
they and Bob will in effect insure one another, each faring better when 
the other fares worse, and each directing payments to the others 
precisely when those others are more needful and they themselves less. 
Likewise, Bob’s non-small-town-dwelling counterparties, and so on.  
 
                                                                                                       
122-23 (2003); ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITU-
TIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS, at v (1993) 
[hereinafter MACRO MARKETS]. See generally Hockett, Just Insurance, supra 
note 3, composed while I was one of Professor Shiller’s students.  
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2. “Estimatabilitating” Inestimatability 
 
Were a liquid market in such index-tied instruments to 
develop—with prices recorded and tracked by the financial press, on 
centralized exchanges, or both—analysts and speculators increasingly 
would be “incentivized” to set about seeking information bearing upon 
the underlying values of the instruments. And that information would 
be impounded in the instruments’ prices, in effect pooling social 
knowledge and making it available to all. Risks themselves would be 
dynamically, fairly, and socially optimally priced (assuming, of course, 
that market participants enter the market upon fair and equal terms) 
over time in view of available and ever-changing social knowledge. 
People situated as were Bob and Barbara in the later 1980s or 
early 1990s would be better able to assess the prudence of making 
Bob’s and Barbara’s own vocational, locational, and real estate-
purchasing decisions—and, of course, better able to hedge such bets as 
they made. The earlier mentioned process of “justice-accounting” 
would thus be eased, at least with respect to many risks. People situated 
as Bob’s prospective insurers would be likewise advantaged. Contracts 
between such parties would be more readily made with confidence 
about what was being “bet” upon, and the contracts themselves would 
be amenable to more temporally-flexibly defined—indeed, valua-
tionally fluctuating—”bets.” 
3. Symmetricalizing Asymmetric Information 
The same information-uncovering, -pooling, and -impounding 
effects just described would render information bearing upon future 
wealth and income prospects more widely available. Information would 
be more efficiently generated, pooled, publicized, and shared. Adverse 
selection—the circumstance in which those wishing to sell risk-bearing 
know more than those ready to purchase it—would considerably recede 
as a problem.  
So would moral hazard, in that individuals—other than, say, 
Janet Yellen, the President, or particularly effective terrorists—
generally would be unable directly or significantly affect the values of 
the underlying macroeconomic indices. Prospective insurers of Bob 
and Barbara would worry less that he or she knows something that they 
do not. And they would no longer need worry that Bob or Barbara 
might actually bring about the eventuation of the risk that they were 
seeking to insure. 
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V. Where Is The Better Betting Market? Wherever We Build It 
 
So why, then, does this “better betting market” not yet exist? 
Much of the reason, I suggest, has been hinted at above.133 We are 
faced with inertial challenges, grounded in contract and market struc-
tures predicated upon long-established expectations as to what sorts of 
information can be generated, pooled, and shared; how often it can be 
supplemented, pooled, and shared anew; and how transactions can be 
framed around such information-technical modalities. But there are 
other difficulties as well. So perhaps it will be well to enumerate them, 
along with their likely means of solution. 
 
A. Indices and Index Numbers 
  
The better betting markets that we’ve been imagining rely 
upon macro-indices. These have to be constructed. The challenge that 
this presents is that these are theoretically daunting to construct.134 The 
task requires masses of data, and inherently contestable assignments of 
“weights” to vector components in the reduction of vector to scalar 
quantities. There is not yet a great deal of appreciated private incentive 
for their production. 
But there is an obvious solution. First, governments and/or 
international organizations can establish a central database, at which 
various instrumentalities that gather economic data can pool that data. 
Then governments, nonprofits, public-minded professionals (e.g., 
ABA, the NASD, NARED, etc.), or some combination thereof can 
develop the initial indices from those numbers. These might be supple-
mented later by private actors appreciating potential profits. The story 
of the Human Genome Project serves as a telling example.135 
 
                                                 
133 See supra Part III. 
134 See generally IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS: A STUDY 
OF THEIR VARIETIES, TESTS, AND RELIABILITY (1922); CHENG HSIAO, 
ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA (1986); THEORY AND APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
INDICES (Wolfgang Eichhorn et al. eds., 1978). See also SHILLER, MACRO 
MARKETS, supra note 132, at 152-81. 
135 The project began as a government effort until three private firms entered 
the field. See, e.g., About NHGRI: A Brief History and Timeline, NAT’L 
HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., http://www.genome.gov/10001763 ((last 
updated Jan. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3WVW-R83J. 
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B. Supply-Side Incentives 
 
Supply side incentive problems pose another challenge. Here, 
the problem is possible rent-appropriation by imitators or marginal 
improvers of newly invented instruments, the prospect of which might 
serve to dissuade would-be innovators from even trying.136 We might 
also worry here about demand-side inertia: Will there be sufficient 
demand? (“Chicken and egg” again.) 
Here too, however, an obvious solution would seem to lie on 
hand. Again, government or public-spirited private sector actors 
(academics, lawyers, investment professionals, etc.) can design the 
initial instruments. Patent protection might be extended as well, if 
necessary.137 We might try, for example, a new kind of patent—
affording a full monopoly on each new instrument, but limiting its 
duration to two or three years. 
 
C. Demand-Side Incentives 
 
Just like the supply side, the demand side present challenges. 
Here the principal problem is apt to stem from simple unfamiliarity 
with the exotic new instruments, or with finance more generally, for a 
time.138  Fear of numbers, “rocket science,” “financial bingo,” “the 
Wall Street game,” and/or unwillingness to learn of and devote 
sustained attention to such matters would also play a role. Would-be 
suppliers and demanders each await some sign from the others that this 
might get underway. (Again, “chicken and egg.”) 
                                                 
136 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, Futures Markets: Their Purpose, Their 
History, Their Growth, Their Successes and Failures, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 
237, 244 (1984); Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover 
Advantages, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 214 (1989). 
137 See, e.g., ALLEN & GALE, supra note 127, at 47-50. Bob Shiller and two 
colleagues patented an instrument of this sort over a decade ago. Press Release, 
Macro Sec. Research, Macro Securities Research Announces New Financial 
Security (Oct. 17, 2000) (on file with author). 
138 See, e.g., ALLEN & GALE, supra note 127, at 3-41, 157-97; Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, More Than Just “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Approach to 
Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (1997). But see Carolyn H. 
Jackson, Note, Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer 
Derivatives, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3205, 3207 (1999) (“Retail derivative 
activity is inevitable. . . . The risk management benefits of derivatives are too 
substantial to be kept from consumers.”).  
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Once again, though, there seems to be an obvious solution. 
That is to “prime the pump.” Government, nonprofits, professional 
associations, academics or some combination thereof can commence 
public information and financial literacy campaigns. We might com-
pare here health literacy, drug literacy, and related public information 
campaigns. Note also that increasing popularity of lotteries might 
represent an opportunity here. Tell folk, “this is a better way to bet”—a 
way that is actually guaranteed, on balance, to lessen all-but-inevitable 
losses. 
Business schools might also develop financial counseling 
clinics, analogous to legal aid clinics afforded by law schools. (I have 
proposed such at Yale School of Management.) Vast infrastructure of 
pension funds, mutual funds, retirement accounts, individual develop-
ment accounts, etc. can be utilized here as well. Should supplemental 
security income, for example, be supplemented by added “private 
accounts,” citizens might be permitted or encouraged to add appropri-
ate macro-hedging instruments, in effect insuring against their specific 
net worth risks, to their individual accounts. The accounts would thus 
evolve into, and be better conceived as, more general “risk-
management accounts,” rather than simply retirement accounts. 
Counseling services currently available to the middle class in 
maintaining their individual retirement accounts and other investment 
vehicles presumably could assist in the selection of such securities, and 
feedback from such counselors could assist suppliers in the 
development of optimally customized, while suitably standardized, 
instruments. (Suze Orman and “Motley Fool” types presumably would 
follow suit and clamber aboard the bandwagon.) 
 
D. Institutional Infrastructure  
 
We will also need new financial intermediaries or exchanges 
and brokerages, or expansions of existing ones, that require and 
facilitate maintenance of margin accounts and enforceability mecha-
nisms. But this can largely be handled via solutions of the kind already 
noted. Government might also afford some start-up cost compensation 
to existing institutions to put the necessary structures in place. We can 
justify it by reference to current social insurance rationales, as well as 
by those offered above—justice and efficiency. 
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E. Regulatory Uncertainty 
 
Another challenge might be posed by regulatory uncertainty. 
Would the new macrosecurities fall within the SEC or the CFTC? 
There might me similar uncertainties at the global scale. ERISA trust 
regulations also might seem to prohibit or severely limit investment by 
some financial intermediaries, notably pension funds, in such instru-
ments. The solution here seems pretty obvious, though. Just decide 
between SEC/CFTC. Provide some safe-harbor under ERISA for some 
degree of experimentation with new hedging instruments as well. And, 
of course, regulate the new markets carefully both on behalf their users, 
through the CFPB, and as important components of a macropruden-
tially regulated financial system.139 As for global regulation, please see 
Subsection F immediately below. 
 
F. Need of Global Cooperation 
 
Finally, in order to secure maximal advantage from the 
prospects offered by these new instruments and markets, we must 
design them and draw counterparties taking opposite sides of them 
without a view to international boundaries. Many of the instruments, 
for example, would derive their values from transnational aggregates, 
and many of the counterparties would hail from different jurisdictions. 
We would thus require transnational agreement on indexing the 
relevant aggregates and, therefore, on accounting principles. We will 
also require, of course, a workable transnational contracting and 
                                                 
139 See Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety 
and Soundness’ to Systematic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 201 (2015); Robert Hockett, Leaning, Cleaning, and 
Macroprudence, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Mar. 27, 2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/27/leaning-
cleaning-and-macroprudence/, archived at http://perma.cc/S869-6U3A; Robert 
Hockett, Practical Guidance on Macroprudential Finance-Regulatory Reform, 
HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/22/practical-guidance-on-
macroprudential-finance-regulatory-reform/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
VUS5-KZ3E; Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The 
Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroecono-
mies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. __ (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 15), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstractid=2239849, archived at http://perma.cc/CXJ8-8HLB. 
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contract-enforcement regime, as well as, of course, a general securities- 
and more general finance-regulatory regime to foster the widest, most 
liquid possible market. 
In many ways, however, global cooperation already is well 
underway along the dimensions needed to secure a functioning global 
market in the new securities. We have a regime of international con-
tracting and contract enforcement, and we have both a developing 
international consensus on accounting and financial solvency principles 
and developing cooperation and shared mindsets on the part of global 
finance-regulatory officials. Much of this development takes place 
under the rubric of the “new international financial architecture” 
fostered by the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the Basle Committee of the 
Bank for International Settlements, the G-20, and other organi-
zations.140   
The development of an individual citizen-friendly, global risk-
market regime would be a natural, and quite incremental, extension to 
this already coalescing framework.141 The key is to ensure that the 
                                                 
140 For works on the “New International Financial Architecture,” see, e.g., 
BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHI-
TECTURE: A PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA 25-27 (1999); RICHARD J. 
HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 120-51 (1995); PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE: WHAT’S NEW? WHAT’S MISSING? 87-117 (2001). See also 
Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive Retrieval for Sustainable 
Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 405 (2013); Robert Hockett, 
From Macro to Micro to “Mission-Creep”: Defending the IMF’s Emerging 
Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability, 
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153, 154-58 (2002); Hockett, Just Insurance, 
supra note 3, at 255; Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of Transna-
tional Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of 
Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 93, 94 
(2005); Robert Hockett, Toward a Global Shareholder Society, 30 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 101, 181 (2008).  
141 Some such data already is beginning to come online. See, e.g., Data, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm (last updated Apr. 8, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/86LR-78BL; EDGAR, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/V8DQ-J2P7; National 
Economic Accounts, U.S. DEPARTMENT COM. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MPL7-QWZX; PANEL STUDY INCOME DYNAMICS, 
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process be permitted to continue. One obstacle to that progress is, of 
course, a growing disenchantment with global financial and economic 
cooperation, which increasingly is seen by many as a source of grand 
dislocation and injustice operating in the service of already wealthy 
interests. Extension of global finance policy to embrace what we might 
call “democratized global risk-management policy” might, then, not 
only result in substantial justice and welfare gains to global society, 
but, indeed, help to legitimate the international economic and financial 
cooperation both through which those gains can best be made, and 
which has done so much to occasion their need.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
  
I trust and hope the point is made. We can insure much more in 
the way of risks to incomes and assets upon which people below the 
tops of wealth and income distributions rely than we do presently. All 
we need do is develop the financial instruments and institutional infra-
structures requisite to their betting on macro-aggregates that correlate, 
in various ways, to their incomes and to the values of their assets. 
Because such aggregates are observable and not moveable by indivi-
duals, and because growing use of these markets as fora for risk trading 
will gradually facilitate more and more accurate risk pricing, enabling 
parties to trade on them, will serve as a very close, very effective sub-
stitute for presently missing, more familiar insurance markets. Working 
to enable this will be working to render the distribution of risks we all 
face simultaneously more just and more efficient, largely in owing to 
justice’s close family resemblance to efficient insurance. 
 Early in the summer of 2006, as the hurricane season opened, 
it emerged that some “online gaming” sites were offering bettors the 
opportunity to bet upon whether another Katrina-like horror might 
                                                                                                       
http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9GL6-HQXQ; The System of National Accounts (SNA), 
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT ECON. & SOC. AFF. STAT. DIVISION, http:// 
unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/ATF8-HLYG. Note, in this connection, similar 
proposals made by Ronald Coase. See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A 
Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 59-70 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972); R.H. 
COASE, The Institutional Structure of Production, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS 
AND ECONOMISTS 3, 10-14 (1994). 
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strike New Orleans again.142 Television commentators and others 
decried the crass tastelessness, even heartlessness, of these offerings. 
Perhaps they were right. All I could think about, however, was how 
lovely it now might become, that New Orleanians and others at last 
might insure against flooding—often offered as the literal textbook case 
of an uninsurable, because definitionally “wavelike,” event.143 In effect, 
what the online gamers were offering was a chance to broaden the risk-
pool for New Orleanian flooding well beyond New Orleans, thereby 
rendering flood insurance at long last available to New Orleanians. 
That would have rendered the distribution of that form of risk both 
more just and efficient than it had been thitherto. 
What I am advocating in this essay is, in effect, simply that we 
re-think that attitude toward the gamers. Instead of categorically 
condemning them, we should use them. For what they offer, ironically, 
is more justice and more efficiency—in a world in which risks appear 
every day more to proliferate. 
                                                 
142 See Wanna Bet That a Hurricane Will Hit U.S.? Now You Can, supra note 1. 
143 See supra text accompanying note 81. 
